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Whether “r ““t one should favor SD1 over the Status 
Quo (more offensive weapons) depends not only 0” 
criteria such as cost, effectiveness, effect on 
world tension, and ally support, but also on the 
assumptions one makes about possible future 
SC.S"SdOS. An analysis of the this complex problem 
was conducted using the Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(Forma”, 1985). 
SCENARIOS 
The analysis addressed the following six scenarios: 
1) A full scale Soviet nuclear attack 
(SOV ATCK) 
2) A limited Soviet nuclear strike (SOV STRK) 
3) A full scale U.S. nuclear attack (US ATCK) 
4) A limited U.S. nuclear strike (US STRK) 
5) The launch of a nuclear ballistic missile 
that is not the intention of either the US 
or SOVIET national authority. This is 
defined to include not only an accidental 
launch, but also a launch by s “madman”, or 
s third world country. (UN’TENTL) 
6) The current scS"Sri0 (PEACE) 
Most of the scenarios, such as a full scale nuclenr 
attack are (hopefully) very unlikely, but if one 
were to occur, it would be devastating. The PEACE 
SCS"SI-i0, on the other hand, is much more likely 
but is’not of much concern. A multipllcatlve model 
was used in which the Importance or impact was 
taken to be the product of likelihood and concern. 
One of the principles of AHP Is to structure a 
model so that direct comparisons are made only on 
factors that are within s” “order of magnitude” of 
one another. 
Thus, our concern with peace, can not be compared 
directly with our concern about the other 
scenartos. Figure 1 shows how the model is 
structured so that the scenarios other than “PEACE” 
are grouped together under the “OTHER” category. 
A comparison of how much swre concerned one is 
about the non-peace scenarios compared to peace is 
problematical. Obviously we are much mufe 
concerned about “OTHER”. In order to proceed, we 
assumed that PEACE wss approximately 20 times more 
likely than “OTHER” and that “OTHER” was 
approximately 1000 times of more cancer” than 
peace. The sensitivity of the results of the 
analysis to these assumptions Is the subject of 
this paper. The reader is referred to Forma”, 
1985 for a discussion details of the process and 
model, including 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
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synthesize over the scenarios to arrive at 
an overall decision. 
1 and 2 show the upper level of the model. 
with priorities representing the relative 
likelihoods and concerns for each of the scenarios. 
Judgments about the relative likelihoods and 
concerns of the OTHER scenarios were made by the 
author to represent his viewpoint. These judgments 
and the resulting priorities are shown in Figures 3 
and 4. 
Figure 1. 
SD1 Scenario Likelihood Factors 
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Figure 2. 
SD1 Scrnario Concern Factors 
Figurr 3. 
Judgments About Scenario Likelihoods 
CRITERIA 
The criteria used in the model (see Flgurrs 6 and 
7) consisted of: 
1) 
2) 
The relative cost of the strategic defense 
initiative VS. the status quo. (COST) 
Thr impact on the attttudes and actions of 
OUT diie~ (ALLIES) 
3) 
4) 
The impact on world tsnsio” (TENSION) 
Thr available time to react to a nuclear 
alert (THINK TM) 
5) Defense of cities and people (SOFT DEF) 
6) Defense of military weapons (missiles, 
piane~, etc.1 (HARD DEF) 
Figure 4. 
Judgmnents About Scenario Concern 
Ench entry In the matrices of Figures 3 and 4 
represents the degree to which the element In the 
TOW was considered to be more likely or of more 
* e. :,. -u ,,“” 
concern than the element in the column. For 
example, a full scale Sovirt Attack wss judged to 
be STRONGLY more of a concern than a limited Soviet 
Strike (as represented by the 5.0 In the first TOW, 
second column of the matrix in Figure 4.) 
The normalized product of the likelihood and 
concern factors results in the scenario importance 
factors show” in Figure 5. 
Figure 5. 
Scenario Imvortance Factors 
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Not all criteria were deemed relevant to each 
scenario. For example, given a full scale Soviet 
Nuclear Attack, cost and the opinions of our allies 
were not included as criteria. Similarly, given 
the peace scenario, think tim. defense of soft 
targets and defense of hard targets were not 
included as criteria. 
Judgments were made (in the form of pairwise 
comparisons) about the relative importance of the 
criteria, given each scenario. The resultant 
priorities can bee seen in Figures 6 and 7. 
Figure 6. 
Criteria and Alternatives given PEACE Scenario 
Figure 7. 
Criteria and given each of the OTHER Scenarios 
ALTERNATIVES 
Judgments about the relative desirability of the 
two alternatives, Strategic Defense Inttiative 
(SDI) and continuation of the present course 
(STATUS QUO) are obviously dependent on the 
scenario and criterion under consideration. The 
Analytic Hierarchy Process allows us to make such 
judgments with respect to each criterion, relative 
to each scenario, and then synthesize the results. 
Thus, we are able to apply our "expert" judgments, 
based on the best available information, to each 
facet of the problem. By doing this, we are able 
to contend with the complexity of this problem, 
which otherwise, is more than the human mind can 
accommodate. 
The relative desirability of the two alternatives 
given each criteria for three of the scenarios 
(PEACE, SOVIET ATTACK, UNINTENTIONAL) scenarios can 
be seen in Figures 6, 8 and 9. (Refer to Forman, 
1985 for complete details.) Examining these 
figures, we see values for the local (L) and global 
(G) priorities for each of the two alternatives, 
with respect to each of the criteria, for the 
respective scenario. Local priorities arr 
priorities relative to the node's parmt. Global 
priorities are the priorities relative to the 
overall GOAL, and are derived by multiplying a 
node's local priority by the global priority of its 
parent. 
For example, given the UN'TENTL scenario in Figure 
9, we sea that the local priorities of the S.D.I. 
and STAT.QUO are .2 and .8 respectively with 
respect to COST. This reflects the judgment that 
the cost would be about four times greater for SD1 
than the STAT.QUO. 
Given this same scenario, S.D.I. is very much 
preferred over STAT.QUO. for providing defense of 
cities and people (SOFT DEF) as well as for 
increasing the think time (THINK TM) for world 
leaders to react to the situation. On the other 
hand, it was judged that the SD1 would not be as 
desirable in defending our hard targets such as 
nuclear missiles as would the alternative of having 
built more missiles (STAT.QUO). 
The reader is referred to Forma", 1985 for details 
about the alternative preferences with respect to 
each criterion for each of the scenarios. 
Figure 8. 
Criteria and Alternatives for SOVIET ATTACK Scenario 
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Figure 9. 
CrCteria and Alternatfves for UNINTENTIONAL Scenario 
SYNTHESIZE OVER 'THE SCENARIOS TO ARRIVE AT AN 
OVERALL DECISION 
Figures 10 and 11 contain details as well as the 
overall results or synthesis of the model. The 
details show the global priorities of the 
scenarios, crtterta, and alternatives, arranged 
from most to least important. The synthesis is the 
sum of the global priorities for each of the two 
alternatives. The surprising result is that, using 
opinions of the experts that oppose the SD1 to make 
judgments where appropriate, our model shows that 
the SD1 is preferred over the STATUS QUO. 
Does this prove that SD1 is more preferable than 
the STATIJS QUO? Not necessarily. The model 
results are dependent on the judgments! Different 
judgments would lead to different conclusions. By 
examining the synthesis details, one would guess 
that if, for example, the PEACE scenario were 
judged to be more important (by judging it either 
more likely or of mc.re concern in the two 
preliminary models), then the STAT QUO would become 
more preferable relative to SDI. This WHAT-IF 
suspicion was investigated by increasing the 
relative importance of PEACE from .019 to .50, and 
doing another synthesis. The suspicion was 
confirmed in that the preference for the STAT QUO 
tncreasrd to .602 while that of SD1 decreased to 
Figure 10. 
Synthesis Details 
Figure 11. 
Synthesis Results 
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
since the relative importance of PEACE Is derived 
from the product of the relative likelihood and 
c""cer" of PEACE vs. the OTHER scenarios, and each 
of these is problematical, It would be helpful to 
investigate the sensitivity of the alternative 
priorities as a function of the relative importance E 
of the PEACE scenario. 
The results of such a sensitivity analysis is B 
contained in Figure 12. The dotted vertical line 
at .019 on the PEACE axis represents the relative 
importance of PEACE based on the current set of 
model judgments. It would take a significant 
increase in the importance of PEACE before the 
STATUS QUO were preferred to PEACE. 
Since the relative importance of PEACE Is 
determined by the normalized product of the 
relative likelihood and c"ncer" for PEACE as 
compared to the OTHER scenarios, it is also 
informative t" investigate the sensitivity of the E 
alternative priorities as a function of the assumed 
likelihood of PEACE. This is shown in Figures 13 
E 
and 14, for assumed c"ncer" ratios of OTHER/PEACE I: 
of 1000/l and 500/l respectively). 
f 
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Figure 13. 
Sensitivity as a function of Peace Likelihood 
(Other/PEACE Concern Ratio at 1000/l) 
Figure 12. 
Sensitivity as a function of Peace Importance 
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Figure 14. 
sensitivity as a function of Peace Ltkelihood 
(Other/PEACE Concern Ratio at 500/l) 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we can see that the more likely one 
considers PEACE, the less preferable the SD1 
alternative. HOWt!VU, the likelihood ratio of the 
scenarios PEACE/OTHER would have to be greater than 
100/l in order for the SD1 to not be the preferred 
alternative. It may well be that those that oppose 
the SD1 are unrealistically overestimattng the 
likelihood that none of the OTHER scenarios, 
including an unintrnttonal launch of a nuclear 
warhead by a super power, or an limited attack by a 
third world country or terrorist group. 
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